A Handbook for the Suppression of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations (Introduction)
| Author | Department of the Army |
|---|---|
| Country | United States of America |
| Subject | Counterinsurgency |
Publication date | 1961 |
| Text | A Handbook for the Suppression of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations online |
| Digital Identifier (JFK Library): JFKPOF-080-014 | |
| Part of a series on |
| Counterinsurgency |
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In the decade and a half since World War II International Communism has won a succession of victories in its struggle for world revolution and domination unequaled in the preceding forty years of its existence. Since the termination of World War II, nearly 700 million people and 5 million square miles» about one-tenth of the total land area of the world and about one quarter of its population, have been brought under the control of communist regimes.'
While occupying the attention of the free world through pressure and the threat of overt military action along the periphery of the Iron and Bamboo curtains and the war in Korea, the communists have concentrated their efforts on the seizure of power in targeted nations through internal means. These target countries now constitute a major portion of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, vital to the defense of the Free World.
Utilizing their established world-wide subversive apparat, employing indigenous communist party cadres, they have exploited a wide variety of techniques ranging the gamut from civil war, revolution, terrorism and guerrilla warfare through psychological and political action to achieve these gains.
Allying themselves with budding national independence movements in colonial areas and popular front type governments in former dictatorships, the communists have scored notable successes and considerable public support through promises of a material betterment and achievement of nationalist aspirations in a wide variety of situations and areas.
The primary and ultimate objectives of the communists has been and will remain the total subversion and seizure of government in all the target areas.
Temporary pauses in this conflict in certain areas have been countenanced by the communists upon achieving interim objectives such as, representation in national front governments, acceptance of communists in the civil, military and police establishments and political recognition of the indigenous communist party.
These phase line pauses afford the communists the opportunity for regroupment and preparatory action in the organizational, psychological and subversive fields prior to the resumption of the offensive in the all-out bid for power.
Diplomatic and financial reorientation of the target areas toward Moscow and/or Peiping is a recognized intermediate objective with the achievement of an anti-west or neutral status of the target as a minimum goal.
The communist strategy and tactics in the form of the so-called "People's War" waged by "Revolutionary Warfare" has evolved through trial and error in five years of civil war in Russia (1918-23) , twenty-five years of conflict in China (1924-49) and continuing conflict in Indo-China and Malaya since 1945.
The pattern and complete nature of the conflict has no precedent in Western European or American history.
The inadequacy of utilizing conventional military tactics, techniques and formations in combating "Revolutionary Warfare" has been amply demonstrated by the Germans, Italians, and Japanese in World War II. Since World War II these mistakes have been repeated by the Greeks, Dutch, French and British as well as by the governments of several smaller countries.
The assumption that the solution of the problem is solely a military one has been proven erroneous.
The basic elements of success of the "People's War" have rested in the active support of a minority of the target population and the tacit support or neutrality of the balance of the people, due largely to apathy, disgust or open hostility toward the regime in power.
The exploitable causes for dissatisfaction have been the elementary desires of the target population for national independence, relief from racial oppression, elimination of colonial or foreign exploitation, alleviation of economic destitution, elimination of corruption and the stabilization of the political and social structure.
Revolutionary Warfare has been defeated or suppressed only in those areas where substantive efforts have been made by the government in power toward the correction of the deficiencies exploited by the Reds, and imaginative positive action taken to insure the support of the population for the government program. Under these basic conditions, the successful prosecution of suppression operations can be initiated, utilizing specially tailored organizations, tactics, techniques and personnel suitably trained for this specific mission.
The failure of the majority of suppressing powers to realize the nature and magnitude of the conflict and the necessity for adoption of special military measures suitable to combat Revolutionary Warfare has resulted in a chain of major military defeats or prolonged wars of attrition precipitating civil collapse and de-facto seizure of power by the insurgents.
The successful employment of large conventional forces in these operations has been characterized by alternating pursuits of guerrilla/terrorist forces in grand sweeps and drives and subsequent withdrawal at the conclusion of the unsuccessful chafe to a defensive posture behind the barbed wire and bunkers to suffer a war of attrition and the relinquishment of control of the countryside to the enemy.
The use of major elements of foreign (to the area) troops to suppress such guerrilla/terrorist operations is neither practicable from a military viewpoint nor psychologically feasible.
These forces are generally unfamiliar with the customs, geography, language, and people of the area and have not been trained in the specific techniques and tactics necessary for successful operations.
The presence of major bodies of foreign troops is unpalatable to the indigenous population and discredits the government in power as a "puppet" or "tool" of the foreign imperialists incapable of ruling without the support of foreign troops.
However, the judicious and timely use of small foreign specialist teams of military and civil personnel for the purpose of providing assistance and advice in this field has proven to be both feasible and successful.
No panacea exists that will provide a quick and easily palatable formula for the suppression of guerrilla/terrorists.
Suppression operations are intrinsically complex in nature and generally must: be conducted over protracted periods of time requiring maximum utilization of all resources available in a unified plan.
The following text outlines the problem, describes the enemy and his operations and indicates the framework of command organization, tactics and techniques employed in suppression operations.
The material presented is neither original nor unique but encompasses those practical measures successfully utilized in past and contemporary operations against guerrilla/terrorist activity.
The organization and content of the material presented is condensed and is of necessity general in nature.