Summary of the Art of War (Art. XLV)

Table of contents -- Chapter VII

Art. XLIV -- Art. XLVI

Article XLV. Formation and Employment of Cavalry.

Full Text

Mendell and Craighill Translation

The use a general should make of his cavalry depends, of course, somewhat upon its numerical strength as compared with that of the whole army, and upon its quality. Even cavalry of an inferior character may be so handled as to produce very great results, if set in action at proper moments.

The numerical proportion of cavalry to infantry in armies has varied greatly. It depends on the natural tastes of [Pg 304]nations making their people more or less fit for good troopers. The number and quality of horses, also, have something to do with it. In the wars of the Revolution, the French cavalry, although badly organized and greatly inferior to the Austrian, performed wonders. In 1796 I saw what was pompously called the cavalry reserve of the army of the Rhine,—a weak brigade of barely fifteen hundred horses! Ten years later I saw the same reserve consisting of fifteen thousand or twenty thousand horses,—so much had ideas and means changed.

As a general rule, it may be stated that an army in an open country should contain cavalry to the amount of one-sixth its whole strength; in mountainous countries one-tenth will suffice.

The principal value of cavalry is derived from its rapidity and ease of motion. To these characteristics may be added its impetuosity; but we must be careful lest a false application be made of this last.

Whatever may be its importance in the ensemble of the operations of war, cavalry can never defend a position without the support of infantry. Its chief duty is to open the way for gaining a victory, or to render it complete by carrying off prisoners and trophies, pursuing the enemy, rapidly succoring a threatened point, overthrowing disordered infantry, covering retreats of infantry and artillery. An army deficient in cavalry rarely obtains a great victory, and finds its retreats extremely difficult.

The proper time and manner of bringing cavalry into action depend upon the ideas of the commander-in-chief, the plan of the battle, the enemy's movements, and a thousand other circumstances which cannot be mentioned here. I can only touch upon the principal things to be considered in its use.

All are agreed that a general attack of cavalry against a line in good order cannot be attempted with much hope of success, unless it be supported by infantry and artillery. At Waterloo the French paid dearly for having violated this rule; and the cavalry of Frederick the Great fared no better at Kunnersdorf. A commander may sometimes feel obliged to push his cavalry forward alone, but generally the best time [Pg 305]for charging a line of infantry is when it is already engaged with opposing infantry. The battles of Marengo, Eylau, Borodino, and several others prove this.

There is one case in which cavalry has a very decided superiority over infantry,—when rain or snow dampens the arms of the latter and they cannot fire. Augereau's corps found this out, to their sorrow, at Eylau, and so did the Austrian left at Dresden.

Infantry that has been shaken by a fire of artillery or in any other way may be charged with success. A very remarkable charge of this kind was made by the Prussian cavalry at Hohenfriedberg in 1745. A charge against squares of good infantry in good order cannot succeed.

A general cavalry charge is made to carry batteries of artillery and enable the infantry to take the position more easily; but the infantry must then be at hand to sustain the cavalry, for a charge of this character has only a momentary effect, which must be taken advantage of before the enemy can return offensively upon the broken cavalry. The beautiful charge of the French upon Gosa at the battle of Leipsic, October 16, is a fine example of this kind. Those executed at Waterloo with the same object in view were admirable, but failed because unsupported. The daring charge of Ney's weak cavalry upon Prince Hohenlohe's artillery at Jena is an example of what may be done under such circumstances.

General charges are also made against the enemy's cavalry, to drive it from the field of battle and return more free to act against his infantry.

Cavalry may be successfully thrown against the flank or rear of an enemy's line at the moment of its being attacked in front by the infantry. If repulsed, it may rally upon the army at a gallop, and, if successful, it may cause the loss of the enemy's army. This operation is rarely attempted, but I see no reason why it should not be very good; for a body of cavalry well handled cannot be cut off even if it gets in rear of the enemy. This is a duty for which light cavalry is particularly fitted.

[Pg 306]In the defensive, cavalry may also produce very valuable results by opportune dashes at a body of the enemy which has engaged the opposing line and either broken it through or been on the point of doing so. It may regain the advantages lost, change the face of affairs, and cause the destruction of an enemy flushed and disordered by his own success. This was proved at Eylau, where the Russians made a fine charge, and at Waterloo by the English cavalry. The special cavalry of a corps d'armée may charge at opportune moments, either to co-operate in a combined attack, or to take advantage of a false movement of the enemy, or to finish his defeat by pressing him while in retreat.

It is not an easy matter to determine the best mode of attacking, as it depends upon the object in view and other circumstances. There are but four methods of charging,—in columns, in lines at a trot, in lines at a gallop, and in open order,—all of which may be successfully used. In charges in line, the lance is very useful; in mêlées, the saber is much better: hence comes the idea of giving the lance to the front rank, which makes the first onslaught, and the saber to the second rank, which finishes the encounter usually in individual combats. Pistol-firing is of very little use except for outpost-duty, in a charge as foragers, or when light cavalry desires to annoy infantry and draw its fire previous to a charge. I do not know what the carbine is good for; since a body of cavalry armed with it must halt if they wish to fire with any accuracy, and they are then in a favorable condition for the enemy to attack. There are few marksmen who can with any accuracy fire a musket while on horseback and in rapid motion.

I have just said that all the methods of charging may be equally good. It must not be understood, however, that impetuosity always gives the advantage in a shock of cavalry against cavalry: the fast trot, on the contrary, seems to me the best gait for charges in line, because every thing depends, in such a case, upon the ensemble and good order of the movement,—things which cannot be obtained in charges at a fast gallop. Galloping is proper against artillery when it is important to get over the ground as rapidly as possible. In [Pg 307]like manner, if the cavalry is armed with sabers, it may take the gallop at two hundred yards from the enemy's line if it stands firmly to receive the attack. But if the cavalry is armed with the lance, the fast trot is the proper gait, since the advantageous use of that weapon depends upon the preservation of good order: in a mêlée the lance is almost useless.

If the enemy advances at a fast trot, it does not seem prudent to gallop to meet him; for the galloping party will be much disordered, while the trotting party will not. The only advantage of the gallop is its apparent boldness and the moral effect it produces; but, if this is estimated at its true value by the enemy, it is reasonable to expect his firm and compact mass to be victorious over a body of horsemen galloping in confusion.

In their charges against infantry the Turks and Mamelukes showed the small advantage of mere impetuosity. No cavalry will penetrate where lancers or cuirassiers at a trot cannot. It is only when infantry is much disordered, or their fire poorly maintained, that there is any advantage in the impetuous gallop over the steady trot. To break good squares, cannon and lancers are required, or, better still, cuirassiers armed with lances. For charges in open order there are no better models for imitation than the Turks and the Cossacks.

Whatever method be adopted in charging, one of the best ways of using cavalry is to throw several squadrons opportunely upon the flanks of an enemy's line which is also attacked in front. That this maneuver may be completely successful, especially in charges of cavalry against cavalry, it should be performed at the very moment when the lines come in collision; for a minute too soon or too late its effect may be lost. It is highly important, therefore, that a cavalry commander should have a quick eye, sound judgment, and a cool head.

Much discussion has taken place about the proper manner of arming and organizing cavalry. The lance is the best arm for offensive purposes when a body of horsemen charge in line; for it enables them to strike an enemy who cannot reach [Pg 308]them; but it is a very good plan to have a second rank or a reserve armed with sabers, which are more easily handled than the lance in hand-to-hand fighting when the ranks become broken. It would be, perhaps, better still to support a charge of lancers by a detachment of hussars, who can follow up the charge, penetrate the enemy's line, and complete the victory.

The cuirass is the best defensive armor. The lance and the cuirass of strong leather doubled seem to me the best armament for light cavalry, the saber and iron cuirass the best for heavy cavalry. Some military men of experience are inclined even to arm the cuirassiers with lances, believing that such cavalry, resembling very much the men-at-arms of former days, would bear down every thing before them. A lance would certainly suit them better than the musketoon; and I do not see why they should not have lances like those of the light cavalry.

Opinions will be always divided as to those amphibious animals called dragoons. It is certainly an advantage to have several battalions of mounted infantry, who can anticipate an enemy at a defile, defend it in retreat, or scour a wood; but to make cavalry out of foot-soldiers, or a soldier who is equally good on horse or on foot, is very difficult. This might have been supposed settled by the fate of the French dragoons when fighting on foot, had it not been seen that the Turkish cavalry fought quite as well dismounted as mounted. It has been said that the greatest inconvenience resulting from the use of dragoons consists in the fact of being obliged at one moment to make them believe infantry squares cannot resist their charges, and the next moment that a foot-soldier armed with his musket is superior to any horseman in the world. This argument has more plausibility than real force; for, instead of attempting to make men believe such contradictory statements, it would be much more reasonable to tell them that if brave cavalry may break a square, brave foot-soldiers may resist such a charge; that victory does not always depend upon the superiority of the arm, but upon a thousand other things; that the courage of the troops, the presence of mind [Pg 309]of the commanders, the opportuneness of maneuvers, the effect of artillery and musketry fire, rain,—mud, even,—have been the causes of repulses or of victories; and, finally, that a brave man, whether on foot or mounted, will always be more than a match for a coward. By impressing these truths upon dragoons, they will believe themselves superior to their adversaries whether they fight on foot or on horseback. This is the case with the Turks and the Circassians, whose cavalry often dismount to fight on foot in a wood or behind a cover, musket in hand, like foot-soldiers.

It requires, however, fine material and fine commanders to bring soldiers to such perfection in knowledge of their duties.

The conviction of what brave men can accomplish, whether on foot or mounted, doubtless induced the Emperor Nicholas to collect the large number of fourteen or fifteen thousand dragoons in a single corps, while he did not consider Napoleon's unfortunate experiment with French dragoons, and was not restrained by the fear of often wanting a regiment of these troops at some particular point. It is probable that this concentration was ordered for the purpose of giving uniformity to the instruction of the men in their duties as foot and mounted soldiers, and that in war they were to be distributed to the different grand divisions of the army. It cannot be denied, however, that great advantages might result to the general who could rapidly move up ten thousand men on horseback to a decisive point and bring them into action as infantry. It thus appears that the methods of concentration and of distribution have their respective advantages and disadvantages. A judicious mean between the extremes would be to attach a strong regiment to each wing of the army and to the advanced guard, (or the rear-guard in a retreat,) and then to unite the remaining troops of this arm in divisions or corps.

Every thing that was said with reference to the formation of infantry is applicable to cavalry, with the following modifications:—

1. Lines deployed checkerwise or in echelons are much better for cavalry than full lines; whilst for infantry lines [Pg 310]drawn up checkerwise are too much disconnected, and would be in danger if the cavalry should succeed in penetrating and taking the battalions in flank. The checkerwise formation is only advantageous for infantry in preparatory movements before reaching the enemy, or else for lines of columns which can defend themselves in every direction against cavalry. Whether checkered or full lines be used, the distance between them ought to be such that if one is checked and thrown into confusion the others may not share it. It is well to observe that in the checkered lines the distance may be less than for full lines. In every case the second line should not be full. It should be formed in columns by divisions, or at least there should be left the spaces, if in line, of two squadrons, that may be in column upon the flank of each regiment, to facilitate the passage through of the troops which have been brought up.

2. When the order of columns of attack doubled on the center is used, cavalry should be formed in regiments and infantry only in battalions. The regiments should contain six squadrons, in order that, by doubling on the center into divisions, three may be formed. If there are only four squadrons, there can be but two lines.

3. The cavalry column of attack should never be formed en masse like that of infantry; but there should always be full or half squadron distance, that each may have room to disengage itself and charge separately. This distance will be so great only for those troops engaged. When they are at rest behind the line of battle, they may be closed up, in order to cover less ground and diminish the space to be passed over when brought into action. The masses should, of course, be kept beyond cannon-range.

4. A flank attack being much more to be apprehended by cavalry than in a combat of infantry with infantry, several squadrons should be formed in echelons by platoons on the flanks of a line of cavalry, which may form to the right or left, to meet an enemy coming in that direction.

5. For the same reason, it is important to throw several squadrons against the flanks of a line of cavalry which is at[Pg 311]tacked in front. Irregular cavalry is quite as good as the regular for this purpose, and it may be better.

6. It is also of importance, especially in cavalry, that the commander-in-chief increase the depth rather than the extent of the formation. For example, in a deployed division of two brigades it would not be a good plan for one brigade to form in a single line behind the other, but each brigade should have one regiment in the first line and one in the second. Each unit of the line will thus have its own proper reserve behind it,—an advantage not to be regarded as trifling; for in a charge events succeed each other so rapidly that it is impossible for a general to control the deployed regiments.

By adopting this arrangement, each general of brigade will be able to dispose of his own reserve; and it would be well, also, to have a general reserve for the whole division. This consideration leads me to think that five regiments would make a good division. The charge may then be made in line by brigades of two regiments, the fifth serving as a general reserve behind the center. Or three regiments may form the line, and two may be in column, one behind each wing. Or it may be preferable to use a mixed order, deploying two regiments and keeping the others in column. This is a good arrangement, because the three regiments, formed in columns by divisions behind the center and flanks of the line, cover those points, and can readily pass the line if it is beaten back.

7. Two essential points are regarded as generally settled for all encounters of cavalry against cavalry. One is that the first line must sooner or later be checked; for, even upon the supposition of the first charge being entirely successful, it is always probable that the enemy will bring fresh squadrons to the contest, and the first line must at length be forced to rally behind the second. The other point is that, with troops and commanders on both sides equally good, [Pg 312]the victory will remain with the party having the last squadrons in reserve in readiness to be thrown upon the flank of the enemy's line while his front is also engaged.

Attention to these truths will bring us to a just conclusion as to the proper method of forming a large mass of cavalry for battle.

Whatever order be adopted, care must be taken to avoid deploying large cavalry corps in full lines; for a mass thus drawn up is very unmanageable, and if the first line is checked suddenly in its career the second is also, and that without having an opportunity to strike a blow. This has been demonstrated many times. Take as an example the attack made by Nansouty in columns of regiments upon the Prussian cavalry deployed in front of Chateau-Thierry.

In opposing the formation of cavalry in more than two lines, I never intended to exclude the use of several lines checkerwise or in echelons, or of reserves formed in columns. I only meant to say that when cavalry, expecting to make a charge, is drawn up in lines one behind the other, the whole mass will be thrown into confusion as soon as the first line breaks and turns.

With cavalry still more than with infantry the morale is very important. The quickness of eye and the coolness of the commander, and the intelligence and bravery of the soldier, whether in the mêlée or in the rally, will oftener be the means of assuring a victory than the adoption of this or that formation. When, however, a good formation is adopted and the advantages mentioned above are also present, the [Pg 313]victory is more certain; and nothing can excuse the use of a vicious formation.

The history of the wars between 1812 and 1815 has renewed the old disputes upon the question whether regular cavalry will in the end get the better over an irregular cavalry which will avoid all serious encounters, will retreat with the speed of the Parthians and return to the combat with the same rapidity, wearing out the strength of its enemy by continual skirmishing. Lloyd has decided in the negative; and several exploits of the Cossacks when engaged with the excellent French cavalry seem to confirm his opinion. (When I speak of excellent French cavalry, I refer to its impetuous bravery, and not to its perfection; for it does not compare with the Russian or German cavalry either in horsemanship, organization, or in care of the animals.) We must by no means conclude it possible for a body of light cavalry deployed as skirmishers to accomplish as much as the Cossacks or other irregular cavalry. They acquire a habit of moving in an apparently disorderly manner, whilst they are all the time directing their individual efforts toward a common object. The most practiced hussars can never perform such service as the Cossacks, Tscherkesses, and Turks do instinctively.

Experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the defeat of the best cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it has also demonstrated that they are not to be depended upon in regular battles upon which the fate of a war may depend. Such charges are valuable accessories to an attack in line, but alone they can lead to no decisive results.

From the preceding facts we learn that it is always best to give cavalry a regular organization, and furnish them long weapons, not omitting, however, to provide, for skirmishing, &c., an irregular cavalry armed with pistols, lances, and sabers.

Whatever system of organization be adopted, it is certain that a numerous cavalry, whether regular or irregular, must have a great influence in giving a turn to the events of a war. It may excite a feeling of apprehension at distant parts of the enemy's country, it can carry off his convoys, it can encircle [Pg 314]his army, make his communications very perilous, and destroy the ensemble of his operations. In a word, it produces nearly the same results as a rising en masse of a population, causing trouble on the front, flanks, and rear of an army, and reducing a general to a state of entire uncertainty in his calculations.

Any system of organization, therefore, will be a good one which provides for great enlargement of the cavalry in time of war by the incorporation of militia; for they may, with the aid of a few good regular squadrons, be made excellent partisan soldiers. These militia would certainly not possess all the qualities of those warlike wandering tribes who live on horseback and seem born cavalry-soldiers; but they could in a measure supply the places of such. In this respect Russia is much better off than any of her neighbors, both on account of the number and quality of her horsemen of the Don, and the character of the irregular militia she can bring into the field at very short notice.

Twenty years ago I made the following statements in Chapter XXXV. of the Treatise on Grand Military Operations, when writing on this subject:—

"The immense advantages of the Cossacks to the Russian army are not to be estimated. These light troops, which are insignificant in the shock of a great battle, (except for falling upon the flanks,) are terrible in pursuits and in a war of posts. They are a most formidable obstacle to the execution of a general's designs,—because he can never be sure of the arrival and carrying out of his orders, his convoys are always in danger, and his operations uncertain. If an army has had only a few regiments of these half-regular cavalry-soldiers, their real value has not been known; but when their number increases to fifteen thousand or twenty thousand, their usefulness is fully recognized,—especially in a country where the population is not hostile to them.

"When they are in the vicinity, every convoy must be provided with a strong escort, and no movement can be expected to be undisturbed. Much unusual labor is thus made necessary upon the part of the opponent's regular cavalry, which is soon broken down by the unaccustomed fatigue.

"[Pg 315]Volunteer hussars or lancers, raised at the time of war breaking out, may be nearly as valuable as the Cossacks, if they are well officered and move freely about from point to point."

In the Hungarians, Transylvanians, and Croats, Austria has resources possessed by few other states. The services rendered by mounted militia have proved, however, that this kind of cavalry may be very useful, if for no other purpose than relieving the regular cavalry of those occasional and extra duties to be performed in all armies, such as forming escorts, acting as orderlies, protecting convoys, serving on outposts, &c. Mixed corps of regular and irregular cavalry may often be more really useful than if they were entirely composed of cavalry of the line,—because the fear of compromising a body of these last often restrains a general from pushing them forward in daring operations where he would not hesitate to risk his irregulars, and he may thus lose excellent opportunities of accomplishing great results.

Table of contents -- Chapter VII

Art. XLIV -- Art. XLVI