Table of contents -- Chapter III
Art. XXVIII -- Epitome of Strategy
Article XXIX. Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.
Summary
Full Text
Mendell and Craighill Translation[1]
There are several kinds of distant expeditions. The first are those which are merely auxiliary and belong to wars of intervention. The second are great continental invasions, through extensive tracts of country, which may be either friendly, neutral, doubtful, or hostile. The third are of the same nature, but made partly on land, partly by sea by means of numerous fleets. The fourth class comprises those beyond the [Pg 170]seas, to found, defend, or attack distant colonies. The fifth includes the great descents, where the distance passed over is not very great, but where a powerful state is attacked.
As to the first, in a strategic point of view, a Russian army on the Rhine or in Italy, in alliance with the German States, would certainly be stronger and more favorably situated than if it had reached either of these points by passing over hostile or even neutral territory; for its base, lines of operations, and eventual points of support will be the same as those of its allies; it may find refuge behind their lines of defense, provisions in their depots, and munitions in their arsenals;—while in the other case its resources would be upon the Vistula or the Niemen, and it might afford another example of the sad fate of many of these great invasions.
In spite of the important difference between a war in which a state is merely an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken for its own interest and with its own resources, there are, nevertheless, dangers in the way of these auxiliary armies, and perplexity for the commander of all the armies,—particularly if he belong to the state which is not a principal party; as may be learned from the campaign of 1805. General Koutousoff advanced on the Inn to the boundaries of Bavaria with thirty thousand Russians, to effect a junction with Mack, whose army in the mean time had been destroyed, with the exception of eighteen thousand men brought back from Donauwerth by Kienmayer. The Russian general thus found himself with fifty thousand men exposed to the impetuous activity of Napoleon with one hundred and fifty thousand, and, to complete his misfortune, he was separated from his own frontiers by a distance of about seven hundred and fifty miles. His position would have been hopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to reinforce him. The battle of Austerlitz—due to a fault of Weyrother—endangered the Russian army anew, since it was so far from its base. It almost became the victim of a distant alliance; and it was only peace that gave it the opportunity of regaining its own country.
The fate of Suwaroff after the victory of Novi, especially in the expedition to Switzerland, and that of Hermann's corps at [Pg 171]Bergen in Holland, are examples which should be well studied by every commander under such circumstances. General Benningsen's position in 1807 was less disadvantageous, because, being between the Vistula and the Niemen, his communications with his base were preserved and his operations were in no respect dependent upon his allies. We may also refer to the fate of the French in Bohemia and Bavaria in 1742, when Frederick the Great abandoned them and made a separate peace. In this case the parties were allies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter relation the political ties are never woven so closely as to remove all points of dissension which may compromise military operations. Examples of this kind have been cited in Article XIX., on political objective points.
History alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant invasions across extensive territories. When half of Europe was covered with forests, pasturages, and flocks, and when only horses and iron were necessary to transplant whole nations from one end of the continent to the other, the Goths, Huns, Vandals, Normans, Arabs, and Tartars overran empires in succession. But since the invention of powder and artillery and the organization of formidable standing armies, and particularly since civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closer together and have taught them the necessity of reciprocally sustaining each other, no such events have taken place.
Besides these migrations of nations, there were other expeditions in the Middle Ages, which were of a more military character, as those of Charlemagne and others. Since the invention of powder there have been scarcely any, except the advance of Charles VIII. to Naples, and of Charles XII. into the Ukraine, which can be called distant invasions; for the campaigns of the Spaniards in Flanders and of the Swedes in Germany were of a particular kind. The first was a civil war, and the Swedes were only auxiliaries to the Protestants of Germany; and, besides, the forces concerned in both were not large. In modern times no one but Napoleon has dared to transport the armies of half of Europe from the Rhine to the Volga; and there is little danger that he will be imitated.
[Pg 172]Apart from the modifications which result from great distances, all invasions, after the armies arrive upon the actual theater, present the same operations as all other wars. As the chief difficulty arises from these great distances, we should recall our maxims on deep lines of operations, strategic reserves, and eventual bases, as the only ones applicable; and here it is that their application is indispensable, although even that will not avert all danger. The campaign of 1812, although so ruinous to Napoleon, was a model for a distant invasion. His care in leaving Prince Schwarzenberg and Reynier on the Bug, while Macdonald, Oudinot, and Wrede guarded the Dwina, Victor covered Smolensk, and Augereau was between the Oder and Vistula, proves that he had neglected no humanly possible precaution in order to base himself safely; but it also proves that the greatest enterprises may fail simply on account of the magnitude of the preparations for their success.
If Napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting diplomatic precautions; in not uniting under one commander the different bodies of troops on the Dwina and Dnieper; in remaining ten days too long at Wilna; in giving the command of his right to his brother, who was unequal to it; and in confiding to Prince Schwarzenberg a duty which that general could not perform with the devotedness of a Frenchman. I do not speak now of his error in remaining in Moscow after the conflagration, since then there was no remedy for the misfortune; although it would not have been so great if the retreat had taken place immediately. He has also been accused of having too much despised distances, difficulties, and men, in pushing on as far as the Kremlin. Before passing judgment upon him in this matter, however, we ought to know the real motives which induced him to pass Smolensk, instead of wintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have been possible for him to remain between that city and Vitebsk without having previously defeated the Russian army.
It is doubtless true that Napoleon neglected too much the resentment of Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, and counted too surely upon a dénouement between Wilna and the Dwina. [Pg 173]Although he fully appreciated the bravery of the Russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of the people. Finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty and sincere concurrence of a military state, whose territories would have given him a sure base for his attack upon the colossal power of Russia, he founded his enterprise upon the co-operation of a brave and enthusiastic but fickle people, and besides, he neglected to turn to the greatest advantage this ephemeral enthusiasm.
The fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the capital point for their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to be given, is "never to attempt them without having secured the hearty and constant alliance of a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a proper base, where supplies of every kind may be accumulated, and which may also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of resuming the offensive." As to the precautions to be observed in these operations, the reader is referred to Articles XXI. and XXII., on the safety of deep lines of operations and the establishment of eventual bases, as giving all the military means of lessening the danger; to these should be added a just appreciation of distances, obstacles, seasons, and countries,—in short, accuracy in calculation and moderation in success, in order that the enterprise may not be carried too far. We are far from thinking that any purely military maxims can insure the success of remote invasions: in four thousand years only five or six have been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearly ruined nations and armies.
Expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea, have been rare since the invention of artillery, the Crusades being the last in date of occurrence; and probably the cause is that the control of the sea, after having been held in succession by several secondary powers, has passed into the hands of England, an insular power, rich in ships, but without the land-forces necessary for such expeditions.
It is evident that from both of these causes the condition of things now is very different from that existing when Xerxes marched to the conquest of Greece, followed by four [Pg 174]thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when Alexander marched from Macedonia over Asia Minor to Tyre, while his fleet coasted the shore.
Nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very true that the assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports will always be of immense value to any army on shore when the two can act in concert. Still, sailing-ships are an uncertain resource, for their progress depends upon the winds,—which may be unfavorable: in addition, any kind of fleet is exposed to great dangers in storms, which are not of rare occurrence.
The more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the line of operations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, are the only points which require any deviation from the ordinary operations of war.
Invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than distant ones, are still not without great danger of failure. A French army attacking Cadiz might find a tomb on the Guadalquivir, although well based upon the Pyrenees and possessing intermediate bases upon the Ebro and the Tagus. Likewise, the army which in 1809 besieged Komorn in the heart of Hungary might have been destroyed on the plains of Wagram without going as far as the Beresina. The antecedents, the number of disposable troops, the successes already gained, the state of the country, will all be elements in determining the extent of the enterprises to be undertaken; and to be able to proportion them well to his resources, in view of the attendant circumstances, is a great talent in a general. Although diplomacy does not play so important a part in these invasions as in those more distant, it is still of importance; since, as stated in Article VI., there is no enemy, however insignificant, whom it would not be useful to convert into an ally. The influence which the change of policy of the Duke of Savoy in 1706 exercised over the events of that day, and the effects of the stand taken by Maurice of Saxony in 1551, and of Bavaria in 1813, prove clearly the importance of securing the strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when their co-operation cannot be obtained.