Summary of the Art of War (Art. XXXII)

Table of contents -- Chapter IV

Art. XXXI -- Art. XXXIII

Article XXXII. Turning Maneuvers, and Too Extended Movements in Battle.

Full Text

Mendell and Craighill Translation

We have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers undertaken to turn an enemy's line upon the battle-field, and of the advantages which may be expected from them. A few words remain to be said as to the wide détours which these maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure of so many plans seemingly well arranged.

It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which is so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking place, of beating the remainder of the army in position. Nevertheless, as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain coup-d'oeil of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many maneuvers of this kind have failed against some commanders and succeeded against others, and why such a movement which would have been hazardous in presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or Wellington might have entire success against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact to take the offensive himself at the proper moment, or who might himself have been in the habit of moving in this manner.

It seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject. The following directions are all that can be given. Keep the mass of the force well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful, however, to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies. A commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for any thing that may happen. If the opposing general shows little skill and seems inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be more daring.

A few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader of the truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of these extended movements depend upon the characters of the generals and the armies concerned in them.

In the Seven Years' War, Frederick gained the battle of [Pg 205]Prague because the Austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards between their right and the remainder of their army,—the latter part remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. This inaction was the more extraordinary as the left of the Austrians had a much shorter distance to pass over in order to support their right than Frederick had to attack it; for the right was in the form of a crotchet, and Frederick was obliged to move on the arc of a large semicircle to reach it.

On the other hand, Frederick came near losing the battle of Torgau, because he made with his left a movement entirely too extended and disconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right of Marshal Daun. Mollendorf brought up the right by a concentric movement to the heights of Siptitz, where he rejoined the king, whose line was thus reformed.

The battle of Rivoli is a noted instance in point. All who are familiar with that battle know that Alvinzi and his chief of staff Weyrother wished to surround Napoleon's little army, which was concentrated on the plateau of Rivoli. Their center was beaten,—while their left was piled up in the ravine of the Adige, and Lusignan with their right was making a wide détour to get upon the rear of the French army, where he was speedily surrounded and captured.

No one can forget the day of Stockach, where Jourdan conceived the unfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a united army of sixty thousand men by three small divisions of seven thousand or eight thousand men, separated by distances of several leagues, whilst Saint-Cyr, with the third of the army, (thirteen thousand men,) was to pass twelve miles beyond the right flank and get in rear of this army of sixty thousand men, which could not help being victorious over these divided fractions, and should certainly have captured the part in their rear. Saint-Cyr's escape was indeed little less than a miracle.

We may call to mind how this same General Weyrother, [Pg 206]who had desired to surround Napoleon at Rivoli, attempted the same maneuver at Austerlitz, in spite of the severe lesson he had formerly received. The left wing of the allied army, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, to cut him off from Vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement of nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile and a half in their line. Napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell upon the center, and surrounded their left, which was completely shut up between Lakes Tellnitz and Melnitz.

Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a maneuver very similar to Napoleon's, because Marmont, who wished to cut off his retreat to Portugal, left an opening of a mile and a half in his line,—seeing which, the English general entirely defeated his left wing, that had no support.

If Weyrother had been opposed to Jourdan at Rivoli or at Austerlitz, he might have destroyed the French army, instead of suffering in each case a total defeat; for the general who at Stockach attacked a mass of sixty thousand men with four small bodies of troops so much separated as to be unable to give mutual aid would not have known how to take proper advantage of a wide detour effected in his presence. In the same way, Marmont was unfortunate in having at Salamanca an adversary whose chief merit was a rapid and practiced tactical coup-d'oeil. With the Duke of York or Moore for an antagonist, Marmont would probably have been successful.

Among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day, Waterloo and Hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. Of these the first was almost altogether a strategic operation, and was attended with a rare concurrence of fortunate circumstances. As to Hohenlinden, we will search in vain in military history for another example of a single brigade venturing into a forest in the midst of fifty thousand enemies, and there performing such astonishing feats as Richepanse effected in the defile of Matenpoet, where he might have expected, in all probability, to lay down his arms.

At Wagram the turning wing under Davoust contributed greatly to the successful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack upon the center under Macdonald, Oudinot, and Berna[Pg 207]dotte had not rendered opportune assistance, it is by no means certain that a like success would have been the result.

So many examples of conflicting results might induce the conclusion that no rule on this subject can be given; but this would be erroneous; for it seems, on the contrary, quite evident that, by adopting as a rule an order of battle well closed and well connected, a general will find himself prepared for any emergency, and little will be left to chance; but it is specially important for him to have a correct estimate of his enemy's character and his usual style of warfare, to enable him to regulate his own actions accordingly. In case of superiority in numbers or discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent were the forces equal or the commanders of the same capacity. A maneuver to outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, and opportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on the enemy's front, either against the wing turned or against the center. Finally, strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of communications before giving battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to be successful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected maneuver during the battle.

Table of contents -- Chapter IV

Art. XXXI -- Art. XXXIII