A Handbook for the Suppression of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations (Chapter IV)
| Author | Department of the Army |
|---|---|
| Country | United States of America |
| Subject | Counterinsurgency |
Publication date | 1961 |
| Text | A Handbook for the Suppression of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations online |
| Digital Identifier (JFK Library): JFKPOF-080-014 | |
| Part of a series on |
| Counterinsurgency |
|---|
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO THE SUPPRESSION OF COMMUNIST TERRORIST/GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
a. The basic causes of revolutionary warfare are seated in the politico-psychological and socioeconomic instability of the country.
b. The guerrilla/terrorist movement is a result not the cause of the problem.
c. The communist ability to activate and exploit a population lie in serious basic problems within the country that have not been resolved. The following written by the leader of a target country is quoted to indicate the typical conditions prevailing. i!5ociaI-economic conditions have become worse for the people since 195_ except for a small favored group which continues to prosper. Living costs continue to rise., employer-labor disputes continue, production continues to fall, and the question of veterans' benefits remains a problem. Even independence has not solved the problem of famine.
The government administration is ill-run and its ranks are swollen until they are not capable of efficient action. Officials are numerous but their quality is low. Corruption permeates the government and incompetent amateurs occupy important posts. Party and family favoritism have a tight grip on the government. There is no clear separation of powers among the various administrative ministries. Orderly administration is a prime condition, not. only for any politico-psychological and socioeconomic undertaking but also for political security within the country. To make the administration good and healthy will require a great deal of time and effort; it cannot be achieved by miracles. In this demoralizing atmosphere, spiritual standards and norms of decency are lowered. The evaluation of good and bad is more and more controlled by emotional desires. These symptoms are observed by the leaders themselves; Therefore, the solution of the problem depends in the first place on these leaders applying the rules to themselves. One cannot expect improvement of the basic problems of security, order and peace in one or two years."
d. The anti-guerrilla terrorist war is an attempt at pacification. It consists largely of constructive efforts while a conventional conflict is largely destructive. The military contributes but cannot win the conflict without extensive changes and reforms to eliminate the causes of dissension and revolt. e. Unless the government achieves an ascendancy of ideology and aims over those offered by the guerrilla/terrorists and convinces the people of their intent to implement extensive changes and reform the forces of revolutionary war will eventually win. Positive action by the government to publicize and implement their political, socioeconomic and psychological reform programs are essential conditions to the initiation of successful military operations against the guerrilla/terrorists, and are the foundation on which a military victory must be achieved.
f. The anti-guerrilla/terrorist operations must aim at severing the enemy from their base within the people, and must, therefore, emphasize political, psychological and economic actions. The guerrilla/terrorists must be opposed by his own tactics, consisting of offensive actions carried out in a mobile flexible fashion. A military operation alone has never been shown to extinguish guerrilla opposition of a significant nature.
g. All anti-terrorist/guerrilla operations must be conducted within the framework of an overall national plan in which the objectives, forces and methods of implementation are specified. Appropriate roles, missions and tasks for the political, economic, military, police and press media of the country are necessary. The objective cannot be achieved solely by the elimination of guerrilla bands.
h. (1) To implement the control and direction of the national plan Joint Commands (Pacification Committees) are established at the national, regional or provincial, county and village levels.
(2) Pacification committees consist of representatives of the civil government, military, police, national security, intelligence organs, economic and psychological agencies of the government at the aforementioned levels.
(3) The commanders of the major commands are selected by the Chief of State based on leadership ability, reliability, intelligence and freedom from conflicting partisan interests.
(4) Staffs are constituted from selected representatives of appropriate governmental agencies listed above at the levels concerned.
(5) Wide latitude and authority is delegated to the commander and the resources and personnel of the area concerned are placed at his disposal.
i. Broad general direction and centralized control is exercised at the national level with maximum decentralization and emphasis placed on operational freedom and initiative at the regional and local levels. Maximum observance of this exercise of freedom of initiative and decentralized operational command control is absolutely necessary to successful and swift exploitation of localized opportunities and varied circumstances.
j. Forces utilized by the government include the following:
(1) Regular military units.
(2) National police or civil guard units.
(3) Municipal and local police.
(4) Civilian self-defense forces at local levels.
(5) National and state intelligence and security elements.
(6) Special police as necessary.
(7) Agents, informants, "galvanized guerrillas" and other disaffected or captured red personnel.
(8) Press, radio and public information organization. k. Principals of operation and implementation incorporate the following concurrent activities:
(1) Assumption and continuation of the offensive at all levels. Use of positive measures and the avoidance of reliance on purely passive and static defensive measures. Stress is placed on the military qualities of aggressiveness, mobility and flexibility, coupled with extensive, accurate and timely intelligence coverage of the area of operations.
(2) Practice of economy of force employing suitable arms and equipment and utilizing the guerrillas/terrorists own weapons and tactics to destroy him by:
(a) Maintenance of continued military pressure in the form of attacks, raids, ambushes and pursuit to keep the enemy in a constant state of alarm for his own security preventing his rest, resupply and implementation of offensive operations.
(b) Infiltration of guerrilla/terrorist organizations and the establishment of extensive informant nets within the population.
(c) The following practices are avoided:
1. The policy of widespread assignment of small military detachments to essential defensive tasks as garrison, rail and road sentries subject to defeat in detail.
2. The dispatch of large size (regiment and division) conventional units to destroy guerrillas, unless the guerrilla/terrorists have organized and are utilizing similar formations and such units have been brought to bay.
3. Waste of military manpower involved in manpower saturation tactics practiced by simply garrisoning large military forces in an area of guerrilla/terrorist operations in hopes that the physical presence of troops will deter enemy operations.
4. Expenditure of manpower and energy in large-scale terrain sweeps or drive tactics unless the enemy has been decisively defeated in a specific locale and the objective is pursuit.
(d) The general movement of military and police forces out of the garrisons and cities and off the roads and trails into the realm of the guerrilla/terrorist units in continuing all weather operations is established as a basic element in the concept of operations.
(e) The attack and destruction of guerrilla/terrorist bases in sparsely populated areas by suitably tailored military and police forces is undertaken as soon as possible and is vigorously pressed to a successful conclusion in a continuing all weather campaign.
(f) Intensive psychological campaigns aimed at severing the support or toleration of the populace for the guerrilla/terrorists.
(g) Maximum effort to induce defection in the ranks of the guerrilla/terrorist through offers of amnesties and "resettlement" as well as psychological operations aimed at separation of the Red command from the rank and file.
(h) Establishment of self defense forces of civilians at the local village and hamlet level.
(i) Material aid and assistance to devastated areas in form of food, medical assistance, and rehabilitation and reconstruction.
(j) Resettlement of evacuated areas with reliable populations adequately supported by the government.
(k) Initiation of needed reforms in the more obvious problem areas accompanied by removal of corrupt and inefficient officials and the arrest of red collaborators at all levels.
(l) Institution of strict controls on travel, personnel, documentation, firearms, explosives, munitions and export-import licenses.
(m) Avoidance of policies of reprisal or unduly restrictive or harassing actions interfering with the normal activities of the population.