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12. Modern Warfare in Enemy Territory
Traditional warfare methods interfere to a certain extent with our opponents' supplies, but cannot halt them.
The conventional army, as we have seen, deploys its considerable resources on a field of battle devoid of the enemy. It cannot meet him except by chance, because the two normally operate on completely different planes, and the army's attacks fall more often than not into a void.
It is accepted that the final stake of modern warfare is the control of the populace. The army should therefore make its main effort in those areas where the population is densest; that is, in the cities. But in Algeria, after a few spectacular early successes (the battle of Algiers in 1957), the large cities were abandoned to enemy terrorist organizations, while the main troop units chased after small and unimportant bands in unpopulated regions.*[1]
(It should be stressed that this recurring error springs from the fact that the army by tradition rejects the use of the modern warfare methods it little understands. On the other hand, the violence of attacks the army has undergone in certain intellectual circles, and the poor backing it has received from the government, have certainly not encouraged it to involve itself in operations for which it is in any case poorly prepared.)
Attacked on our own territory, we must first defend ourselves. Then we may carry the war to the enemy and grant them no respite until they capitulate. We will attack them on their terrain with weapons of modern warfare that will permit us to strike directly, in their territory, without exposing ourselves to the international complications the employment of traditional arms would surely evoke.
The conduct of modern warfare requires close collaboration with the population. We must first assure ourselves of its support. Experience has demonstrated that it is by no means necessary to enjoy the sympathy of the majority of the people to obtain their backing; most are amorphous, indifferent. We will limit ourselves to forming an active elite and introducing it as leaven into the mass to produce action at the desired moment.
We need cadres first, and they are easy to find. (In the former French Union, a number of men remained devoted; this was amply demonstrated in Indochina, and later in Algeria.) They are doubtless more attracted by the benefits they expect than by our country itself, but this attachment can be unflagging if we are resolved to accept it and are firm in our intentions and objectives. We know also that, in troubled periods, self-interest and ambition have always been powerful incentives for dynamic individuals who want to move out of their rut and get somewhere. Self-interest and ambition can be consistent with an ideal and with honorable intentions. It is this ideal and these intentions that we must discover. In each country, within each race, in every social stratum, we must find a reason, an idea, often different ones in neighboring areas, but capable nonetheless of constituting adequate motivation for the assumption of necessary risks. The present troubled period, with its social and ideological struggles, provides a broad field for research through which we can find the basic elements appropriate to our undertaking.
As every state, every political system has its opponents and internal enemies, so will the regime we want to destroy. Their numbers are always large in a nation occupied by foreign troops, under a dictatorial regime, and in certain outlying regions where popular opposition to the central power has not disappeared.
It is among these that we will find the cadres we need.
ESTABLISHMENT OF MAQUIS ZONES
The installation of advance elements on enemy territory requires a prior study in depth to determine the areas into which we ought to direct our efforts. The study should gather information on the physical, economic, and human geography; the current psychological climate, and the disposition of military and police forces. This study will permit us to determine which areas will be more responsive to our action and where the conduct of a large operation can be most effective.
At first, our resources will be very limited. We must therefore choose the least protected areas—sparsely populated mountain regions, for example, where secrecy can be maintained for the time needed to plant our contact teams. Our action begins with the establishment of maquis zones on foreign territory.
Experience has shown that in an area suited to the setting up of a maquis team, there is no room for two masters —the land belongs to the first occupant. Accordingly, it is very difficult to dislodge the people already living there. The rugged life led by the maquis, the fear they must inspire among the surrounding inhabitants in order to subsist, will oblige the natives to support them despite themselves. In those areas where we intend to begin, we must become the primary force, to prevent the rise of any authority other than our own.
For taking over a particular maquis zone, we recruit initial cadres and, if possible, a leader to take over the area command who will be representative of the ethnic and geographic group predominant in that zone.
The cadres should be from the area in question and know it perfectly, in order to be able to make recruiting contacts with men who will be entrusted with creating the assembly areas of future maquis teams. They should all be local people or persons who have maintained friendly connections or family relationships.
The Contact Teams
These first volunteers will be assembled in a special camp for training contact teams. Following a process of rigorous selection, they will be classified into three categories—combat personnel (about 50 per cent of the volunteers), communications specialists (25 per cent), and political and intelligence agents (25 per cent).
Their training will consist of basic general instruction (political, psychological, military, paratroop, counterintelligence) and specialized instruction (in particular, communications). This training will be conducted by specialized volunteer cadres, officers, and N.C.O/s, who will ultimately assume charge of the maquis bands when they are activated.
At the end of the first training period, lasting two or three months depending on the intellectual capacity of the pupils, the first contact missions will be constituted. They will generally be composed of a team leader and his assistant (taken from among those who received the specialized instruction for combat personnel), a communications specialist (voice), and two political and intelligence agents. About ten such teams will suffice to prospect the maquis zone, and to make the contacts necessary for creating bases. The other volunteers will continue their training, especially the wireless operators, whose instruction must be especially thorough.
At the right moment, the contact teams will be assembled together in the maquis zone. This will be accomplished by night parachute drops, or by infiltration by land or water. Night drops of small teams by trained air crews offer the advantage of great secrecy and spare the men both a long difficult trek and the risks of interception.
Each team is independent and operates in the vicinity of a village that is well known to at least one of the agents and in which it will be possible to renew friendly connections and make desirable contacts. Radio communication will enable the work of the teams to be monitored.
When the contact mission is well under way, the team leader and an intelligence agent return to base, usually by a land route.[2] By this time, they should be familiar enough with the terrain not to run any risk. They will take along with them a few picked young people, already given some basic training, to enroll them in the maquis commando. The assistant team leader, the communications specialist, and an intelligence agent remain in the area so that contacts are maintained and, if possible, improved. This phase of taking up positions and making contacts should last from one to two months.
Information furnished by the contact teams, coordinated upon the return of the team leaders, will enable the officer commanding the maquis to follow the evolution of the situation. It enables him to direct the recruitment and training of the necessary personnel, particularly that of the maquis command, which should consist of about 100 men. He can coordinate radio contact with the teams remaining in the field. He will be able to set the precise limits of future maquis zones, designate and study parachute drop areas, and establish quotas for weapons, radios, and other materiel.
When all the equipment has been mustered, when the training of the commando group, the team leaders, and the various specialists is completed, when the organization of the zone is fully coordinated, an effective maquis should be set to work as soon as possible.
The maquis team chiefs are parachuted first. Upon their arrival, they will organize their maquis teams for personal protection. Maquis action begins immediately with the dismantling of the local administration. The maquis leader follows his commando unit and radio equipment. He establishes himself as the ultimate authority in his area and puts an end to any action of the local police or gendarmerie that interferes with his activity. A few well-calculated acts of sabotage and terrorism will then compel any reluctant citizens to give the required cooperation. Harassment of communication lines can begin, which will lead to the isolation of the maquis zone. By means of internal subversion, insecurity can be sowed in the surrounding villages.
Once this important phase is complete, the development and extension of the maquis zone will depend on the leader and the reactions of the enemy. Effective weapon strength should rapidly reach 1,000 rifles. Experience has shown that a maquis team of 1,000 armed men, supported by 2,000 or 3,000 collaborating inhabitants, is practically invulnerable to the police forces.
If several maquis efforts are launched at the same time, they can create disturbances of incalculable magnitude in the enemy's country of support.
Other quicker and more brutal techniques can be employed. One used in Indochina led to the installation of 20,000 organized and equipped partisans in the Upper Region of Tonking and in Laos in a single year. This figure was to be increased to 50,000 in the autumn of 1954, which would have permitted the soundly based reconquest of Upper Tonking, the haunt of large Vietminh units. Unfortunately, this action, undertaken on the initiative of General de Lattre de Tassigny, came too late. The regrettable Dien Bien Phu incident brought the sudden cessation of hostilities and prevented us from exploiting our opportunities in depth.
The action of French maquis teams did, however, permit the evacuation without losses of the fortified camp of Nasan; the reconquest by Laos of the provinces of Phong-Saly and Sam-Neua without the help of regular troops; the total interdiction of the direct road from Lao-Kay to Dien Bien Phu for the entire duration of the siege, as well as the immobilization of more than fourteen battalions of the Vietminh regular army on Route R.P. 41, the umbilical cord of the besiegers; the recovery of hundreds of prisoners, etc.
And yet, the establishment of maquis in the Tonkinese Upper Region, right in the middle of an area under Vietminh control, seemed a gamble when it was undertaken in 1952. This potential of the maquis command, although scarcely noticed at the time and already forgotten, ought not be lost sight of.
Once large maquis teams are installed, we undertake action in the towns. The maquis zones will serve as assembly areas and as refuge areas for forces charged with creating a feeling of insecurity in the small surrounding towns.
The large towns and cities in themselves constitute maquis zones. The extent of their surface area, their population density, the difficulty of establishing there a strict control over a large and concentrated population, will permit our agents to set themselves up, to organize, and to create a reign of insecurity sufficient to cause the authorities considerable trouble.
Concealing the Build-up
In order to succeed, our action in enemy territory has to be carried out with discretion. We must recruit, assemble, and train our maquis elements in absolute secrecy. A camp capable of training 500 men, located in an isolated area of difficult access, will serve our needs.
The most practical method, the one guaranteeing the best results, is to turn over a frontier sector command to whoever is designated to prepare and conduct the necessary action. The regular sector forces would continue their usual tasks during the maquis training period and would be in a position to support them when action begins.
In no case do regular troops, elements of regular troops, or isolated nationals cross the frontier. Our intervention troops will receive only enemy weapons and equipment, captured in combat or otherwise procured. Many of our maquis will b$ recruited directly from among the enemy, especially from among prisoners, and natives of the territory where our action takes place.
Thus, we will have carried the war onto foreign territory without using regular troops. With respect to international opinion, the movement we launch may be presented by ourselves and our friends as an internal uprising, from which we are apparently divorced but which nonetheless has our official sympathy. We will attempt to give the military action a clearly defined political character and, if possible, a symbolic leader to represent it. We will give it any assistance that will contribute to its development, in anticipation of the moment when the international situation permits us to give aid officially.
Certainly our opponents won't be deceived; they will know from where the blows are coming. But their protests will carry no more weight than our own. Modern warfare, not having been codified, remains officially ignored. Any diplomatic intervention would look like meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign country and would be rejected.
Peace may then be re-established only on our own terms; that is, when the aid given to our enemies has ceased.
3.11 -- Conclusion