A Handbook for the Suppression of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations (Chapter VIII)
| Author | Department of the Army |
|---|---|
| Country | United States of America |
| Subject | Counterinsurgency |
Publication date | 1961 |
| Text | A Handbook for the Suppression of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations online |
| Digital Identifier (JFK Library): JFKPOF-080-014 | |
| Part of a series on |
| Counterinsurgency |
|---|
SCENARIO EXAMPLE OF TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
Within the concept of organization and conduct of operations in Chapter VI (see sketch showing deployment of PC Forces in local area), the following type scenario actions are illustrated as examples. The purpose of incorporating these examples is to afford substantive illustrations of some of the types of detailed activity, circumstances and tactics that may accompany the operations.
a. Meeting engagement pursuit and interception:
While conducting a pre-dawn foot patrol from the Temporary Base west of Town "C" to Hamlet "F" a reinforced rifle squad of the patrol company suddenly encounters at approximately 50 yards range a group of 5-8" men crossing the road south of Hamlet "F" at about 0500 hours.. A shrill bird whistle is sounded by the patrol as the prearranged challenge and is almost immediately answered by a burst of sub-machine gun fire from the group of suspects. Fire is immediately returned by the patrol who have hit the ground as the challenge was sounded.
A second whistle by the patrol leader signals a rush attack by bounds. The patrol advances firing and receives a return fire from the guerrillas. On signal the patrol hits the ground and short, fuze grenades are thrown. Figures are seen running into the woods to the west. The patrol leader halts his advance and immediately organizes his pursuit. The patrol radio operator has notified Co CP at the Temporary Base that a contact has been made, the patrol location and the direction of the guerrillas' withdrawal. (Five minutes have elapsed since the guerrillas were sighted.)' Two guerrilla bodies are found near the road. One guerrilla is dead, the other wounded. Two patrol members, have been wounded. A National Policeman attached to the patrol begins an immediate interrogation of the wounded guerrilla. The trail dog is given the scent and placed on a long leash. The patrol, less two (2) guards left for the wounded and prisoner, advances in a skirmish line maintaining visual contact.
The Co CP has dispatched by truck an intercept squad to take up positions on the main road running west of town and south of the incident area.
The regular patrol squad operating to the west of Hamlet "F" is alerted and directed to move to intercept and maintain radio contact with the squad engaged in pursuit.
A request for helicopter reconnaissance flight over the area is dispatched by the PC Base to Regional HQs along with the contact report.
An ambulance and truck with half a rifle squad accompanied by police interrogators leave for the scene of the incident.
Fifteen minutes after initiating pursuit the patrol encounters a wounded guerrilla located by the trail dog. The guerrilla is killed resisting arrest. A short time later the trail indicates that the remaining element's of the guerrilla formation (estimated 4-5 personnel) have split into two groups. One heading north and the other south. The patrol leader decides to split his remaining force of seven men and continue pursuit of the larger northern group with four men, the radio operator and the dog. The second in command is detailed to tail two men and follow the smaller southern group estimated at 2 men. The Co CP and both the other friendly patrols in the vicinity are informed of the decision utilizing simple voice code on the radio.
At 0630 the reconnaissance helicopter is over the area and in voice contact with the four man patrol headed north and the other patrols in the area.
At 0645 the helicopter reports sighting three men briefly in a patch of woods on a low ridge between the estimated position of regular patrol operating in the area and the pursuit patrol.
Direction and position of the subjects is reported and the regular patrol operating in the area assumes intercept positions perpendicular to the axis of the movement.
The distance between the intercept patrol and the converging pursuit patrol is estimated at a mile and a half at this time.
Intercept positions are established by the regular patrol and to the south by the additional squad from the Temporary Base as indicated on the sketch.
At approximately 0730 three men appear on a low rise 50 yards to the front of the intercept patrol and approach on a diagonal. All are armed and in civilian clothes.
At approximately 100 yards range the guerrillas note something suspicious and take cover. Heavy fire is opened immediately by four men of the regular patrol who can observe the guerrillas. One guerrilla is observed to dash back over the rise the two others are found dead.
The patrol reports the intercept and initiates pursuit of the remaining guerrilla.
The element of the patrol pursuing the southern guerrilla party is ambushed by their quarry and the patrol leader (assistant squad leader) is killed and one man slightly wounded. The two surviving patrol members move to the main road to the south and are picked up by the southern intercept squad blocking the main road at 0930 hours.
At 1115 hours two figures dash across the road toward the western end of the area covered by the intercept patrol.
Fire is opened by two soldiers observing the crossing. A burst of machine pistol fire downs one guerrilla; the other makes a getaway. The intercept squad organizes immediate pursuit and notifies Co Base of its action. The guerrilla downed is. wounded and a police interrogator is sent for. In the meanwhile, the assistant squad leader interrogates the subject and another soldier acts as security.
Pursuit of the remaining two guerrillas is broken off at 1600 hours. The following information is obtained from the first wounded guerrilla apprehended. The terrorist patrol was en route to a rendezvous with a support element to cache supplies somewhere west of Hamlet "F".
Parent guerrilla unit was the "Red Hammer Band" of sixty-seven armed terrorists presently located in the center of the PC area. The captured guerrilla reveals that the terrorist patrol consisted of nine men and that on initial contact the getaway man probably made good his escape as he was 50-100 yards in rear of the main group.
The PC Base prepares immediate actions against the rendezvous area and the reported locale of the "Red Hammer" unit base realizing that the guerrillas have., in all probability, received word of the action and moved. Interrogation of the captured guerrillas is continued.
Box Score:
Government Force
13 Man Patrol
2 KIA
2 WIA
Guerrilla/terrorist
9 Man Action Group
2 WIA
4 KIA
3 Escapees
b. Attack by government forces:
At 1800 hours Hunter Killer Team »o. 4 operating between and north of Town “A” and Village “B” reports location of a guerrilla encampment located in the vicinity of a destroyed mill. Tight enemy security prevents detailed reconnaissance of the site.
Guerrilla/terrorist strength is estimated at 25-30. Enemy strength and disposition indicates that an attack by the Hunter-Killer Team would be only partially effective and would permit the escape of the majority.
The Hunter-Killer Team is restricted by the PC Base to area surveillance to prevent compromise of their presence. Plans for an attack get underway immediately. Ground reconnaissance by troop leaders will not be possible due to approaching darkness and the security considerations. A night attack is ruled out because of the same considerations and the probability of darkness covering the escape or withdrawal of the guerrilla/terrorist unit.
The assistant patrol leader of Hunter-Killer Team No. 4 exfiltrates from the area and is picked up at a rendezvous spot by a jeep and returned to the PC Base at 2000 hours.
The PC commander assisted by his staff prepares his plan of attack based on the detailed information of the area provided by the Hunter-Killer Team.
A dawn attack by the reserve rifle company, reinforced by two additional Hunter-Killer Teams, a 20 man section of National Police and an Aero Combat Recon Company from the Regional Pacification Force is planned.
Region approves the plan and allocates an Aero Combat Recon Company to the Local Pacification Committee for the duration of the operation. By midnight the LPC S-3 Air Liaison Officer and the Company Executive Officer of the attacking rifle company depart by helicopter for the air base to brief the Aero Combat Company on its mission and accompany the unit in the attack.
(See sketch of attack) The Hunter-Killer party from Team No. 4 at locale No. 7 quietly removes the guerrilla sentry and guides units to assembly positions south of the stream. The stream is about 3-4 feet deep and banks are negotiable by foot troops. Troops arrive in position about thirty minutes prior to the initiation of the attack.
PHASE I - The Assault:
Attack is led off by the Aero Weapons Platoon Helicopters at 0640 rapidly approaching Hill 411 from the north and salvoing rockets and directing machine gun fire into the nose of the hill occupied by the guerrillas and the guerrilla machine gun position at #5. Immediately behind the A-jro Weapons Platoon the Aero Infantry Platoon lands and initiates the attack of the bivouac.
Hunter-Killer Team #4 in position on Hill 411 signals their position by flares and signal rockets as the Aero Weapons Platoon approaches and occupy blocking position on the ridge to the west of the guerrilla bivouac. As the signal flares from Hill 411 are fired by HK Team #4 the attacking troops cross the stream and move on the double to occupy the blocking positions indicated.
The Aero Weapons Platoon provides cover for the landing and attack of the Aero Infantry Platoon and covers the open areas to the west of the clearing. The helicopters of the Aero Infantry Platoon land in the reserve area near position #7 and move an additional rifle squad and a team of National Police to Hill 411.
PHASE II - The Sweep:
As anticipated the suddenness and violence of the attack causes the guerrillas to immediately abandon their bivouac and initiate their emergency evacuation plan.
One group attempts to escape down the ridge to the west and is turned back by HK Team #4. The attack of the Aero Infantry Platoon drives the remainder off the high ground and into the woods to the southwest of their bivouac.
While the bivouac site and Hill 411 are being cleared and secured the troops from the south have occupied the blocking positions.
The reinforced Aero Infantry Platoon then holds Hill 411, the 2d Rifle Platoon and the National Police secure the eastern edge of the circle.
The 1st Platoon reinforced by HK Teams #4 and #6 conduct a sweep through the woods to the east swinging on a pivot near position #6 to drive the remaining guerrillas toward the open area north of the 2d Platoon blocking positions. Their limit of advance is the eastern edge of the woods parallel to the trail, leading from Hill 411 to the Old Mill.
Automatic weapons are placed behind the sweep area sighted along the edges of the woods to take care of any individuals slipping through the converging line.
After considerable heavy fighting the sweeping troops arrive on the no-fire line. A few guerrillas not accounted for in the sweep are cut down as they attempt to move individually across the cleared area ahead of the troops or escape through the woods in the 2d Platoon area.
The operation is concluded with the extermination or capture of 27 terrorists. From prisoner interrogation it is learned that three terrorists escaped during the attack and another eleven were absent on operations.
c. Defense:
(1) Guerrilla Situation
The guerrilla/terrorist band (72 effectives) in the area to the west of Community "C" has been hard hit by the Government restrictions on food and the system in force of central rationing and cooking control in the towns and villages. Outlying farms have seldom more than three days rations for the inhabitants on hand and raiding continually for much small stores is both unprofitable and dangerous. Recent raids by government HK Teams have resulted in the disclosure and destruction of three of the bands food caches.
Winter is approaching and the Armed Bands' emergency food stocks are dangerously low. A short rations policy has been in force for more than a week and the effects on the morale of the guerrilla/terrorist personnel is already evident. Red District Headquarters can offer little support in augmenting the rations and the leader is instructed to take "vigorous steps" to improve his situation. It is therefore a reluctant decision by the Armed Band Leader that initiates planning for the attack.
Attacking an armed village defended by its inhabitants for the purpose of obtaining supplies with military reinforcements within seventeen (17) miles road distance of the target area is not 'an easy task. However, Community "G" appears to offer the best chances of success considering both the size of the defending force, distance from reinforcements and the quantity of food available.
It is estimated that approximately twenty tons of tinned, dried and sacked provisions are stored in the Community Warehouse in "G."
The guerrilla leader hopes to be able to obtain 1C-12 tons of these supplies and calculates his means to move and dispose in cache sites this rather large amount of stores.
Trucks, as well as carrying parties will be used and the routes to, as well as the cache sites themselves must be prepared in advance.
His village intelligence informs him of the strength, disposition, and routine of the defense force.
The decision is made to launch the attack late in the afternoon to catch the community while the majority of the 3DF are still scattered at work in the fields, seize the supplies and make their withdrawal under cover of darkness utilizing a maximum period of darkness to transport and cache the loot, as well as covering their tracks and drawing off pursuit.
The time factor is important and a maximum time of three hours on target for the complete operation is allocated. The Armed Band knows that PC Base will respond immediately to the emergency attack call from “C", and that government forces realize that they (the guerrilla/terrorists) will have arranged a series of road blocks, mines and other interdictory type ambushes enroute to the target area and therefore will, of necessity proceed at relatively low road speeds, toward ''G''.
One delaying action ambush of some size is planned several miles to the south of the main road, between Village "D" and Town "C", another to the north on the main road east of Village. "D". Each ambush will be' executed by six guerrillas armed with machine pistols, automatic rifles and grenades. The mission of these ambush parties is to execute maximum delay on government forces attempting to reach the target area. Two additional parties of five men each will construct barriers and plant mines along the routes at other points.
Five (5) trucks supplied by the support organizations will be utilized by the guerrillas to transport the bulk of the supplies to off loading points where carrying parties will move them to the caches.
Air attack by government forces is discussed by the guerrillas and it is decided that because of the proximity of the village and the difficulty in distinguishing between the civil populace and the guerrillas that aerial suppressive fire by government aircraft cannot be effectively employed.
The time factor and approaching darkness appear to rule out the relief of the community by airborne forces. Detection and elimination of the self-defense outposts is placed high on the priority task listing.
Target date for the attack is tentatively set for the following week.
(2) Defense Situation (See Sketch):
Community "G" (350 population) in the eastern portion of the PC locale has recently reorganized its defense subsequent to the completion of the self-defense units training program, An army sergeant and two national policemen are stationed in the community.. The army sergeant is in command of the self-defense section of thirty men. The two police are responsible for intelligence and normal police activity. Two special constables are assigned from the PC Supply Section as guards at the community storehouse. Only ten of the thirty men are on duty at any one time excepting emergencies, alerts or daily formations. The other men continue their regular civilian pursuits but are obliged to maintain their arms with them at all times and assemble on call. The platoon is armed with rifles and shotguns. Two automatic rifle, a light machine gun and a bazooka are retained at the SD Post where a radio is operated netting with the PC Base. Three handle/talkie type radios are used by OP's established and maintained by the SD Section. Community "G" has not previously been subject to attack by the guerrilla/terrorists but was occupied by an Armed Band for several days during the initial insurrection.
On several occasions outlying farms have been raided for food contributions.
Three young men of the community are known to be with the guerrilla/terrorist units, their families have been removed from the community.
Two other families in the area have recently requested permission to leave the area. The reasons given for the desire to move do not appear to be valid.
Police informants in the area have failed to turn up any definite information, but realize that some of the population are restive. PC Base is notified and the local 3D unit is quietly informed of the need for increased vigilance. For a period of two weeks nothing unusual occurs and the populace appear to have lost their uneasiness.
At 1700 hours on the day of the attack the ten man 3D Section on duty is deployed as follows: 2 men each on the North and South Road Check Station/Barriers; 2 men on patrol between OP #1 on Hill 44C and the woods to the north, one man each at OP 1 & 2, and two men in the 3D Post, one in the sandbagged watchtower with a BAR and one on the gate near the base of the hill.
The Army Sergeant is in the 3D Compound area. One policeman is on duty near the radio, the other is in the village area. Three off duty SD personnel on patrol the previous night are sleeping in the compound area.. Half a dozen of the off-duty personnel are working in the village area, the balance are in the fields adjoining the community.
At 1705 a young boy from Farm "A" arrives at the SD Compound on the run, shouting that there are "Reds" in the woods to the east of his house.
A truck approaches the South Road Block and is observed by the sentry in the watchtower. It contains a man in police uniform and a soldier standing in the bed behind the cab. A tarpaulin covers the rear of the truck. The occupants of the cab cannot be observed. The truck is obliged to halt at the road barrier and the 3D sentries are observed talking with the occupants.
The sentry at the gate to the 3D Compound is suddenly fired on and killed by a woman crossing the street who produces a concealed sawed-off shotgun. The woman then runs off in the direction of the warehouse.
Two other women open fire at the constable on duty at the gate of the storehouse fence, wounding him and hurl grenades at the large warehouse door. The sentry returns the fire, eliminating one of the women and in turn is killed by the remaining woman who enters the warehouse and opens the large side doors.
Firing is heard from the south roadblock, and the sentry in the watchtower who is by this time tolling the large alarm bell, observes the truck pass the roadblock and speed toward the village.
He shouts the information ;to the sergeant who is turning out the sleeping members of the 3D unit in the compound.
The policeman on duty at the radio is relaying the alarm to the PC Base.
Three groups of approximately ten armed men each are seen moving toward "G" on the double in a skirmish formation.
The first group is between Farm "A" and the 3D Compound. The second and third groups are approaching from the direction of Farms "B" and "C" respectively. Firing is heard from the vicinity of Farm "B". The speeding truck rams the closed wooden village vehicle gate knocking it open. The watchtower sentry takes the truck cab under fire with the ' BAR and the truck swerves to a halt inside the village. A group of armed men concealed in the bed leap to the ground and take cover in the roadside ditch and commence firing at the SD Compound.
The Sergeant posts an additional BAR near the east edge of the compound directing fire at the truck borne group at the base of the hill and the storehouse area, and sets the LMG up with the remaining two men on the west to cover the approach of the group from Farm "A". Light mortar shells, start landing in the vicinity of the SD Compound. The Sergeant launches a red and green flare signaling the assembly of the dispersed SD personnel outside the village at previously established assembly points north and south of the community in accordance with the rehearsed defense plan SOP.
The boy from Farm "A" is dispatched by a wire gap entrance from the compound to the village with a message for the SD personnel in the village to take the group at the southgate and the storehouse under fire.
The mortar fire increases and hits are scored on the buildings in the compound and one is set on fire. The guerrilla truck group attempts an attack up the hill to the compound under cover of the mortar fire but are driven off with several casualties.
Firing is heard in the eastern edge of "G" and guerrillas are seen scaling the fence and removing wire from the rear of the storehouse fence.
Sporadic firing is heard from the vicinity of Farm "B" and Hill 440.
The forward movement of the guerrillas from Farm "A" is halted by the machine gun fire from the compound.
One of the houses between the 3D Compound and the warehouse is on fire. The SD man in the watchtower reports a group of guerrillas in the vicinity of the mill at the northeast edge of the community.
The attack has been underway for forty minutes and it is almost dark.
1745 Two reconnaissance helicopters arrive over the area and circle the community. Attempts to establish communications between the helicopters and the SD section by radio fail.
Visual blinker signals are transmitted by the Sergeant requesting the helicopters fire on the storehouse. However, ground visibility conditions from the air by this time prevent observation of the target which is obscured by smoke from burning buildings and darkness.
1810 From the sounds of firing grenade blasts and screaming and yelling in the village the guerrillas are clearing the community buildings from north to south and will shortly control most of "G" outside the compound. Trucks are heard approaching the village from the east along the road track.
1820 Firing is renewed to the east of the village toward Farm "C" and the mortar fire on the SD Compound is resumed. The SD man in the watchtower is killed and one man on the machine gun is wounded. The SD Control Post Building receives a direct mortar' hit putting the radio out of action and setting the roof of the building on fire. A Force of about fifteen guerrillas again attempt to storm the SD Compound but are driven off.
1830 The mortar fire lifts and a lull in the small arms firing follows. The sound of trucks backing up and turning around accompanied by considerable shouting of commands is heard in the area of the storehouse.
1845 The watchtower is manned against several BAR magazines loaded with tracers. The bazooka is assembled and the supply of twenty rounds of 3.5" ammunition readied. The storehouse is taken under fire by the bazooka and tracer fire from the two BAR's. Several hits are scored, by the bazooka on the storehouse, and two fires are started in the building. The firing continues until the bazooka ammunition is exhausted.
1900 The guerrilla mortar fire starts again and several machine guns and other automatic weapons take the compound under heavy fire. The policeman is wounded. The Sergeant prepares to abandon the compound. Kerosene is thrown on the buildings, and the copies of the community records, rosters and other documents are readied for burning.
The two wounded SD. men are armed and concealed in a cellar.
1910 Preparations for evacuation are halted at the sound of helicopters approaching. Recognition flares are ignited by the SD personnel in the compound. Blinker signals from the helicopters indicate that two helicopters will discharge personnel in the compound area and request a pad be illuminated.
A small landing pad is outlined in kerosene and ignited and a flare is lighted on the sandbagged roof of the watchtower.
The helicopters make a rapid approach under fire and in succession hover and hastily discharge two officers, eight riflemen, a HK Team and four National Police. Equipment bundles slung under the helicopters are dropped while hovering.
Three of the reinforcements, are wounded during the landing.
1930 The defense of the compound is reorganized and radio communications with the PC Base and the helicopters re-established.
Flares are dropped by the helicopters and a truck proceeding along the East Vehicle Track is taken under fire.
Smoke obscures the storehouse area from aerial observation.
Reports from PC Base indicate that the northern relief group is engaged at a road block about seven miles north of "G" and another group moving in from the south is about five miles from "G".
1945 The guerrilla/terrorists fire slackens and trucks are heard moving to the east.
Grenade detonations and firing is heard in the area to the east of Farm "C" and "B".
The helicopters are requested to illuminate the area but refrain from firing.
Two trucks are observed halted on the vehicle track about 1200 yards east of "G", one is on fire. The small arms fire from this area continues.
2000 A runner arrives at the compound area from the element of the 3D unit caught working north of the community area at the initiation of the attack. They relate the following events:
"A" group of eight SD members assembled at the northern rendezvous" area 100 yards north of town about 45 minutes after the attack was initiated. This group moved into the woods east of Farm "C" by dark and proceeded toward the vehicle track where several trucks were heard moving toward "G". A three (3) man patrol was dispatched to "G" to attempt to re-establish contact with the SD Compound and determine the situation. The patrol returned reporting that the guerrillas controlled the town, were looting the storehouse and loading trucks with the contents. They also reported that the SD Compound was under heavy guerrilla fire and they could not penetrate to effect a contact.
The patrol returned and an ambush of the guerrilla vehicles was layed on the vehicle track. The ambush was sprung and two out of four guerrilla trucks moving to the east were knocked out. A fire fight .with the guerrilla escort developed and the ambush group retired.to the wooded area to the north.
The main guerrilla force was seen to be retiring from "G" in small groups as the runner worked his way to the 3D compound. Cattle were being herded east and groups of civilians under guard were also observed moving with the guerrillas.
The HK Team is immediately dispatched with the runner to return to the ambush area, pick up the 3D ambush group and maintain contact with the retreating guerrillas and the radio progress to the 3D Compound.
2020 The relief column from PC Base arrives. Pursuit of the guerrillas is organized and implemented.
A portion of the relief troops are detailed to fire fighting, collecting wounded and dead and assisting civilians.
(3) Summary and Critique:
(a) The defense of "G" by the 3D Section although failing to prevent penetration of the community by the guerrilla/terrorist band was successful in thwarting the accomplishment of their mission.
The psychological aspects of the operation should not be ignored.
The guerrilla/terrorists were forced to withdraw hastily with only a fraction of the supplies needed after suffering considerable casualties. The population and the SD Section gained confidence in their ability to fight and defend their fields and homes.
The actions of the guerrilla/terrorists during the attack have alienated the populace from further voluntary support of their cause, and have renewed their belief that their own defense force assisted by government troops is capable of defeating the enemy.
The impact on the morale of the guerrilla/terrorists and their confidence in their leader and their ability to exercise coercion on the local populace has been shaken. A vigorous pursuit and follow-up by government forces should exploit this defeat.
(b) The guerrilla/terrorist leader realizes that several basic factors were involved in the failure of his operation, including:
1. Lack of adequate guerrilla/terrorist forces in the attack.
2. Self-defense organization and techniques involving fluid type defense of the community area.
3. Failure to consider the impact of air-delivered government reinforcements to assist in control of key points.
(c) Disposition and tasks of the attacking guerrilla/ terrorist band indicates the variety of tasks and requirements necessary to mount an operation under the security situation prevalent in this area.
1. Total guerrilla/terrorist force - 94 (66 guerrilla/ terrorist band; 28 civilian support organization)
2. Organized and deployed as follows:
| a | Security Force | (Ambush Parties) | 12 | |
| (2-6 Man Groups) | ||||
| (Mine Planting) | ||||
| (and Obstacle Detail) | 10 | |||
| = 22 |
| b | Attack Force | (Interior Assault Pty) | 4* | |
| (Crash Truck Detail) | 6 | |||
| (Main Atk. Grps. Farms A-C) | 28 | |||
| = 38 |
| c | Transport Force | (Truck Drivers and Guard) | 10 | |
| (Carrying Party) | ||||
| (Porters and Loading Detail) | 24* | |||
| = 34* |
*Civilian Support Organization Personnel
*Civilian Support Organization Personnel