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9. The Problem of Resources
The traditional army, having at its disposal large numbers of trained troops and an abundance of modern materiel, in the final analysis is completely incapable of overcoming a practically destitute enemy whose leaders and men have received only rudimentary military training. Incredible as this seems, it is nonetheless a bitter reality.
A slave to its training and traditions, our army has not succeeded in adapting itself to a form of warfare the military schools do not yet teach. Its valiant efforts, sufferings, and sacrifices serve to obstruct the enemy, to slow down the execution of his plan, but they have been incapable of stopping the enemy from attaining his objective.
The army usually strikes into a vacuum, and fruitlessly expends considerable materiel Nor would a significant increase in materiel bring a solution any closer. It is how we exploit our resources that we must completely revise.
If we want to meet the guerrilla successfully and to defeat him within a reasonable period of time, we must study his methods, study our own methods and their potential, and draw from this study some general principles that will permit us to detect the guerrilla's weak points and concentrate our main efforts on them.
The following table compares simply the guerrilla's basic resources with those of the traditional army:
| Traditional army | Guerrilla band |
|---|---|
| 1. Has large numbers of wellarmed troops, ready supplies of food and ammunition. | 1. Has small numbers of poorly armed troops (at least at the beginning of hostilities), difficulty in obtaining supplies of food and ammunition. |
| 2. Can move quickly over favorable terrain (aviation, motor vehicles, boats, etc.). | 2. Can move only on foot |
| 3. Has a well-organized communications network, which gives it great control advantages. | 3. Has little long-distance communications equipment (at least at the outset), which leads to difficulties in coordinating operations. |
| BUT | BUT |
| 1. Experiences great difficulty in moving about guerrilla country; usually has imperfect knowledge of the terrain. | 1. Chooses own terrain, is well adapted to it, can move quickly, and quite often disappears into it |
| 2. Has practically no support from the population, even if it is not hostile. | 2. Has the support of the population (either spontaneous or through terror), to which it is closely tied. |
| 3. Has great difficulty in getting information on the movements and intentions of the guerrilla. | 3. Gets information on all our movements from the populace and sometimes (through agents infiltrated into our midst) on our intentions as well. |
By studying this table, we can see that the guerrilla's greatest advantages are his perfect knowledge of an area (which he himself has chosen) and its potential, and the support given him by the inhabitants.
The advantages of the traditional army are imposing superiority in numbers and in materiel, practically unlimited sources of supply, and the advantages of command and extended maneuver granted by modern methods of communication and transport.
What can the guerrilla do with the means he has at his disposal?
He chooses the terrain and imposes it upon us. It is usually inaccessible to heavy and quick-moving equipment, and thus deprives us of the benefit of our modern arms. We are forced to fight on foot, under conditions identical to those of the guerrilla.
On his terrain, which he knows perfectly, he is able to trap us easily in ambushes or, in case of danger, to disappear. On the other hand, if he is an incomparable fighter on his own grounds, or in an area to which he has adapted himself, the guerrilla loses a great deal of his value in new or unknown terrain. He also is inclined not to leave his area, but clings to it except in case of absolute necessity, because he knows that away from his own terrain and deprived of his means of support he is only a mediocre fighter.
We have already seen how indispensable the support of the population is to the guerrilla. It is possible for him to exist only where the people give him their unqualified support. He cannot live among a populace he has not previously organized and subjected to his will, because it is from it that he must draw his sustenance and protection.
It is the inhabitant who supplies the guerrilla with his food requirements on an almost daily basis, thereby enabling him to avoid setting up cumbersome supply points —so easily identifiable and difficult to re-establish. It is the inhabitant also who occasionally supplies him with ammunition. The inhabitant contributes to his protection by keeping him informed. Our rest and supply bases are located in the midst of a populace whose essential mission is to keep an eye on them. No troop movement can escape the inhabitant. Any threat to the guerrilla is communicated to him in plenty of time, and the guerrilla can take cover or trap us in profitable ambushes. Sometimes the inhabitant's home is the guerrilla's refuge, where he can disappear in case of danger.
But this total dependence upon terrain and population is also the guerrilla's weak point. We should be able, with our more powerful potential, to make him submit or to destroy him by acting upon his terrain and upon his support—the population.
Knowing that the guerrilla sticks to the area of his choice, we ought resolutely to engage him there. Once we have occupied the terrain, we ought to have the will and the patience to track him down until we have annihilated him. This requires time, and our operations will be long.
We know also that he is less of a fighter away from home. We should therefore devote ourselves to making him forgo the benefit of his terrain by causing him to leave it. Whenever possible, we should interrupt his food supplies, much more important than his supplies of ammunition. Action of this kind often implies political or economic measures that do not always fall within the purview of military leaders, but they should be used whenever possible.
Above all, we must loose the guerrilla's hold on the population by systematically destroying his combat organization. Finally, we must permit the people to participate in their own defense and to protect themselves against any offensive return of the enemy, by having them enter into the structured organization we have already described. Such an organization must be established without delay in areas we control that could be the refuge of armed bands.
To recapitulate our rapid analysis, we have three simple principles to apply in fighting the guerrilla—to cut the guerrilla off from the population that sustains him; to render guerrilla zones untenable; and to coordinate these actions over a wide area and for long enough, so that these steps will yield the desired results.
The fight against the guerrilla must be organized methodically and conducted with unremitting patience and resolution. Except for the rare exception, it will never achieve spectacular results, so dear to laurel-seeking military leaders. It is only by means of a sum total of perfectly. coordinated, complex measures—which we are going to make an effort to study—that the struggle will, slowly but surely, push the guerrilla to the wall.
Before drawing some practical conclusions about the conduct of operations against the guerrilla, we should examine those the U.S. Army conducted with complete success in Korea. Thanks to a series of methodically conducted operations, the army was able, in a relatively short period of time, to eliminate completely the guerrillas who had installed themselves behind the American lines in 1950.
In an article entitled "Beating the Guerrilla/' (Military Review, December, 1955), Lieutenant Colonel John E. Beebe, of the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, draws profitable lessons from these operations.
Military operations alone he says, are not sufficient. Counterguerrilla operations have two objectives—the destruction of the guerrilla forces, and the eradication of their influence on the population.
The counterguerrilla plan to prevent the formation of guerrilla units or to destroy them if they have been formed, since it will comprise measures that are political, economic, psychological, administrative, and military, must be prepared at a very high command echelon.
For the conduct of operations against the guerrilla, he recommends that the command post of the counterguerrilla forces be established near the guerrilla zone and that troops penetrate the zone of the guerrilla and install bases of operations there, taking the necessary security precautions. Then a plan of combat and ambush against the guerrillas can be prepared, with the idea in mind of constantly maintaining pressure to deprive them of any chance of resting or of reorganizing and preparing new operations.
This operation will end only when there are no longer any guerrillas in the area. Counterguerrilla operations involve large numbers of soldiers and last many months. In Korea, there were two examples.
Operation Ratkiller, in the mountainous region of southwest Korea, was conducted by three divisions—two Korean and one American—to which was added a police battalion. It lasted three and a half months, from December 1, 1951, until March 16, 1952, during the course of which 11,000 guerrillas were killed and 10,000 taken prisoner.
Operation Trample, against guerrilla elements still remaining in the south of Korea, was conducted by two divisions from December, 1953, until June, 1954—just about six months. It was the last of the operations against the guerrilla, and the first during the course of which the population gave its total support to the troops responsible for the maintenance of order.
These lessons do not differ from those that may be drawn from several successful counterguerrilla operations in South Vietnam, at the beginning of the Indochina campaign, and even in Algeria.