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2. Modern Warfare Defined (Modern Warfare)
Since the end of World War II, a new form of warfare has been born. Called at times either subversive warfare or revolutionary warfare, it differs fundamentally from the wars of the past in that victory is not expected from the clash of two armies on a field of battle. This confrontation, which in times past saw the annihilation of an enemy army in one or more battles, no longer occurs.
Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, psychological, military—that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime. To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit the internal tensions of the country attacked—ideological, social, religious, economic—any conflict liable to have a profound influence on the population to be conquered. Moreover, in view of the present-day interdependence of nations, any residual grievance within a population, no matter how localized and lacking in scope, will surely be brought by determined adversaries into the framework of the great world conflict From a localized conflict of secondary origin and importance, they will always attempt sooner or later to bring about a generalized conflict.
On so vast a field of action, traditional armed forces no longer enjoy their accustomed decisive role. Victory no longer depends on one battle over a given terrain. Military operations, as combat actions carried out against opposing armed forces, are of only limited importance and are never the total conflict.
This is doubtless the reason why the army, traditionally attracted by the purely military aspect of a conflict, has never seriously approached the study of a problem it considers an inferior element in the art of war.
A modern army is first of all one that is capable of winning the conflict in which its country is engaged. And we are certainly at war, because we run the risk of being finally defeated on the ground (as at Dien Bien Phu in May, 1954) and because, in case of such a defeat, we shall have to cede vast territories to our opponents.
The struggle we have been carrying on for fifteen years, in Indochina as well as in Algeria, is truly a war. But what we are involved in is modern warfare.
If we want to win, it is in this light that we must consider it from now on.
Studies have been made in many countries of what is called subversive warfare. But they rarely go beyond the stage of guerrilla warfare, which comes closest to the traditional form.
Mindful of the Allied victory in World War II, and perhaps because it is more appealing to study successful combat methods than to dwell upon the reasons for a defeat, only the offensive use of the guerrilla has been considered. But the study of effective counter-measures has been neglected. Some authors have stressed the inadequacy of the means employed against the guerrilla; others have simply counseled reacting against the guerrilla—confronting him with the counterguerrilla to beat him at his own game.
This is to wish to resolve a problem quickly without having duly weighed it.
The subtlest aspects of modern warfare, such as the manipulation of populations, have been the subject of recent studies. But only some of the methods employed by an enemy to consolidate his hold over conquered populations in peacetime have been investigated, in particular the working of psychological action on the masses.
But the rallying of opposition and the study of effective means of protection have been neglected. More exactly, when the enemy's methods and their application have been recognized, propaganda and pressures have always been powerful enough to influence a poorly informed public and to lead it systematically to refuse to study or use the same methods.
We know that the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of a population. According to Mao Tse-tung, it is as essential to the combatant as water to the fish. Such support may be spontaneous, although that is quite rare and probably a temporary condition. If it doesn't exist, it must be secured by every possible means, the most effective of which is terrorism.
In modern warfare, we are not actually grappling with an army organized along traditional lines, but with a few armed elements acting clandestinely within a population manipulated by a special organization.
Our army in Algeria is in excess of 300,000 men supplied with the most modern equipment; its adversary numbers some 30,000, in general poorly equipped with only light weapons.
If we were to have an opportunity to meet this enemy on the traditional field of battle, a dream vainly pursued for years by many military commanders, victory would be assured in a matter of hours.
The war has lasted more than six years, however, and victory is still uncertain. The problem is more complex.
In seeking a solution, it is essential to realize that in modern warfare we are not up against just a few armed bands spread across a given territory, but rather against an armed clandestine organization whose essential role is to impose its will upon the population. Victory will be obtained only through the complete destruction of that organization. This is the master concept that must guide us in our study of modern warfare.