Patterns of Conflict Slide 46

Patterns of Conflict

Patterns of Conflict Slide 46

Quantico Transcription

The key point here, they really didn’t appreciate the importance of irregular tactical arrangements and activities. In other words, you look at— like say here, the opponent comes [unintelligible]. Top down. Emphasize adaptability at the top, regularity at the bottom. I made the point, I said that’s one of those pervasive influences that came forward to the present day. One of my great Army colonels got up and he said, “You’re wrong.” I said, “Why?” “Because today we’ve got regularity at both top and bottom.” [audience laughter] I said, “I’ll remember that. That’s very good.”

So, why did that occur? In the first case that’s what happened. Why did they gravitate to that?

Remember Napoleon himself. Even though he was a product of the Revolution, he also
reinstalled the aristocracy, where, you know, the aristocracy wants to control the people below them. So he did that. Plus the fact that he’d got a large empire here. He had to use foreign troops. He wanted to be able to also control them. So those kind of things happened. So, in a sense, by his own conquest and by elevating his own positions, he starts doing the kind of things that the people did before him that allowed him to take then down. I guess you can go back to Lord Acton’s statement, “Power corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

Audience: Was that because in peacetime, he—
Boyd: Well, yeah. He was trying to run the whole Empire, and he had these allies, you know, the Prussians, who were supposed to be subservient to them, and so he had to put down stringent rules upon them. He wanted to be able to control them. Obsession for control. Obsession for control; that’s what we’re talking about. And the more you try to control people, guess what?

The less control you get. It’s like a paradox. In other words, the more you try to constrain their activities, the more people resist that and the less control you really get. That’s why the sergeant had a very good point. His point was, you’ve got to make those people responsible below feel like they’re part of the action. They’ve got things they need to do, and we’re not going to treat them like automatons. The more you try to treat them like automatons, that’s obsession for control.

Wyly: That doesn’t necessarily mean the less control you get of the people. You might have them under control but the less control you have of the situation.

Boyd: That’s right.

Wyly: So it’s deceiving. People can think they have control—
Boyd: That’s right. They really don’t have it. They really don’t have it. That’s right. Like a paradox. Exactly right. It’s like a paradox. Exactly right. Got to keep those things in mind all of the time. It’s like discipline. You don’t really want to be able to discipline people. What you want to inculcate in them is a sense of self-discipline because then you have discipline. If you always have to discipline people, you got a problem. You want to be able to set things up [20:00]so inside themselves they build up a sense of self-discipline. That’s what counts. That’s what you want to do as a commander or a leader, be able to inculcate them with a sense of self-discipline. Then you’re a real commander. You’re a real leader. Not only that, you have real control then, too.

Audience: Sir, when you developed this, can you recall any rationale why you looked at these three theorists—
Boyd: Not only that, people don’t mind it because they feel like they’re part of the team. You see what I’m saying? Go ahead.

Audience: When you developed this, can you recall the rationale why you just limited it to these three theorists or did you look at—
Boyd: Oh, I just— Remember, I said “historical snapshots.” Since these were the principal theorists out of the 19th century, Napoleon, Clausewitz and Jomini, I wanted to focus on them because they had such a pervasive influence upon what we do today. That’s why I did it. They’re not the only ones. The other guys, you know, made comments too, but these were very important. I mean, I can’t do the whole military history. Somebody could always bring up—That’s why I call it “historical snapshots.”

Audience: I just find it interesting. I think DePuy just added Mahan to it. He used the same three and then he added Mahan.

Boyd: Okay, let me raise a question. Mahan, that’s very interesting. Let’s talk about both Mahan

and Corbett, naval theorists. You being a Marine, you’ve got to bring that up. Well, where did Mahan get his ideas?

Audience: That’s Jomini.

Boyd: From Jomini. Where did Corbett get his ideas? From both Jomini and Clausewitz and Mahan. Corbett got it from all three. The point is, it’s interesting the so-called naval theorists got their ideas from the Army theorists. Period. Now they’re upfront about it. They didn’t plagiarize it. I mean, you know Jomini is very upfront where he got his ideas. I mean, excuse me, Mahan is very upfront where he got his ideas, and so is Corbett. They’re very upfront about it. In other words, you know, they say, “Hey, these guys had some good ideas, but also these ideas can be modified somewhat and be applied to naval warfare as well as land warfare.”

So, you know, there was no plagiarism. They just said these are good ideas, and they could be applied in this context as well as that context. So I don’t want anybody to think that they stole them in that sense, because they were upfront about it. So DePuy probably finally read a naval book to figure out, “Goddamn,” after he retired. Heh heh heh. I got the picture. In fact, I’ve used that in arguments. They say, “well, why don’t you look at naval warfare?” I said, I don’t have to because I know that the same guys the naval warfare guy used in order to build up naval warfare.

Audience: I’ll remember that, sir. That’s good.

Boyd: You can use that against him.

Audience: Sure.